In short, eidetic phenomenology strives for a priori eidetic knowledge ( Wesenserkenntnis), i.e., knowledge of essences and eidetic laws. In Husserl’s view, eidetic phenomenology differs from empirical sciences both methodologically and in the kind of knowledge it seeks. In Ideen I and III, Husserl introduces phenomenology as an eidetic science by opposing it to empirical or factual sciences. The goal is to lay the methodological groundwork for a self-correcting and integrative account of eidetic variation and illustrate its usefulness in research practice. Then, I turn to three applications of eidetic variation in order to examine how eidetic phenomenology could draw from real-life deviations, artificial variations, and critical–historical reflection. To substantiate these claims, I first contrast the self-correcting account with the falsificationist interpretations of eidetic variation. More specifically, I argue that the self-correcting account of eidetic variation 1) is consistent with Husserl’s own formulations of his eidetic methodology and epistemic principles 2) captures the dual epistemic function of eidetic variation as means for both testing and intuitively validating eidetic claims and 3) offers methodological support for contemporary attempts to integrate eidetic variation with non-eidetic methods and resources. In this article, I develop a self-correcting account of Husserl’s method of eidetic variation, arguing that eidetic variation plays a critical role in both challenging and improving upon the eidetic results in phenomenology. Husserl believes that such eidetic knowledge has a higher epistemic status than the inherently fallible empirical knowledge, but a closer reading of his work shows that even eidetic claims are subject to error and open to modification. Edmund Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology seeks a priori knowledge of essences and eidetic laws pertaining to conscious experience and its objects.
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